

KOREA NORTH AND SOUTH: NEVER THE TWAIN SHALL MEET? *
Is Peaceful Cooperation Between Different Systems Possible?

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1. Introduction.

Imagine two countries, C and S, one a capitalist, the other a socialist country. We want to discuss the problems of interaction between them, and not only in the form of exchange but also cooperation, meaning, roughly, that they do something together beyond the mere exchange of persons, goods, and ideas.⁽¹⁾ To do this we shall start with the most basic properties of the two systems, and then gradually fill in more details to make the picture somewhat more realistic.

What are the most basic properties? Liberalism and marxism are broad, encompassing ideological systems, but coming out of late eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe the shared focus is on economic aspects⁽²⁾ - so dynamic at that time - and their social manifestations. Capitalism and socialism are above all economic formations, profoundly affecting production patterns, but also to some extent the patterns of consumption. In both systems production factors - land (ground, raw materials), labor (unskilled, skilled) and capital (money, capital goods) - are brought together and there is processing into products, mainly taking place in factories, in the cities. Neither system is against industrialism. But then there are some important differences:

Table 1. Capitalism and socialism as economic formations.

	<u>Capitalism:</u>	<u>Socialism:</u>
Ownership of means of production	<u>private</u>	<u>collective</u> (state,communal)
Production for	<u>demand</u> , market	<u>needs</u> , basic need of most needy
Mobility of factors and products	<u>unlimited</u> , expansionist,trade	<u>limited</u> , national or local self-reliance, not autarchy
Production methods	<u>high productivity</u> capital and research intensive	<u>lower productivity</u> more labor intensive full employment,participation

Thus, the differences are fundamental enough but they are not located in the often mentioned distinction between private and collective ownership of the means of production - for there is ample experience showing that the state as the owner of the means of production may practice entirely capitalist goals and methods.⁽³⁾ The difference can be spelt out as follows. Under capitalism the ultimate measure of the success of an economic process is the accumulation of capital, leading to production for those who want and can pay for the products, to a "global reach"⁽⁴⁾ when it comes to where to fetch factors and where to market products, investing capital into research so as to produce in ever more efficient manners. Under socialism - essentially a family of related efforts to negate capitalism⁽⁵⁾ - the production is, at least in the first phase, for the satisfaction of the basic needs for those most in need - meaning of food, clothes, shelter, health and education. There is much emphasis on using own factors and much less on trade (again particularly in the first phase); and on securing full employment, even some measure of meaningful participation of everybody.

It may be objected that this is too sketchy and also ideological - but that is exactly the purpose. These, it is claimed, are fundamental features of the "systems", and in much of the debate about the peaceful co-existence between them, the attention is so much on the political moves of the day that the basic underlying characteristics of the systems are easily forgotten. That they undergo modifications is obvious enough - nevertheless these features play a basic role politically in shaping the process of highly uneasy relationship between them. They are simply, in their pure versions that are always somehow underlying the infinitely more complex empirical reality, different things, and partly contradictory things.

This also shows up in the measures, the indicators, of economic activity: the capitalist system would talk about economic growth and measure it in terms of processing and marketing, expressed in gross national product (per capita) where the socialist system would be more concerned with the level of basic needs satisfaction; the capitalist system would talk about the foreign trade and see increase in export as a major goal

where the socialist system would be much more concerned with how one can do without trade, in other words with self-reliance; the capitalist system would be concerned with how many units of the product one can get per capital unit and worker-hour where the socialist system would be more concerned with how many units one can get per unit of land or raw materials (which would also be of interest to the capitalist system, of course). In general, the capitalist system would be concerned with the decrease in workers' role through higher labor productivity where the socialist system would increase the role of workers through higher worker participation.

Let us now pursue these differences sector by sector to see what impact they will have on efforts to achieve patterns of cooperation between the systems, and start with the economic sector itself.

2. Economic relations.

A basic assumption of the capitalist system is that other countries shall be willing to play the capitalist world game, i.e. the game of trade, sell what it has in excess and buy what it does not have - of factors and products alike. But a pure socialist system is not willing to play this game for many reasons: it wants to control its own land and natural resources, to use its capital and labor at home. It would be sceptical if not totally against the import of capital and even skilled technicians because it tends to deform the local economic structure, and equally sceptical of the import of manufactured goods, except, perhaps, capital goods that may enable them better to pursue a policy of self-reliance. Hence, the point of departure is already far from positive when it comes to exchange, leaving alone cooperation. What to the capitalist system is a natural thing, the normal way of operation, becomes to the socialist system economic aggression and something to protect oneself against. Experience proves the latter right to a large extent: exploitation as a part of a general imperialist formation is a major characteristic of world trade, for which reason one would predict that socialism above all is adopted by countries in need

of economic (and political/military) defense against economic (and political/military) invasion - Russia in 1917, Eastern European states after the Second World War, the Asian socialist countries and Cuba - and all the others that have adopted similar patterns, such as Algeria. (6)

There are three kinds of answers to this problem: no interaction at all, interaction in non-economic fields or efforts to find some kind of economic interaction nonetheless. Leaving out the first and the second because it will be explored later, and also because it is often even more problematic given the ideological differences, the question becomes: is there some type of economic exchange that would be acceptable from both a capitalist and a socialist point of view?

We have mentioned one: capital goods, usually in exchange for raw materials. This could take the form of technology, machine tool, factories, labor-saving devices (particularly in agriculture, transportation and in the construction industries). In general this would play into the hands of the more advanced capitalist countries, if the latest technology is what is demanded, also because they can afford to lose money on initial deals, hoping for more to follow. Generally there will be capital export accompanying capital goods export, solidifying the control. But what about all the other types of commodities? Here is an effort to look at the problem systematically:

Table 2. Exchange possibilities between capitalist and socialist economies.

Capitalist	Land	Raw materials	Unskilled labor	Skilled labor	Capital	Capital goods	Products
Land							
Raw materials		C		E	E	D,E	E
Unskilled labor				E	E	E	E
Skilled labor		B	B				
Capital		B	B				
Capital goods		A,B	B				
Products		B	B				F

In the Table we have put the various types of commodities (in the broadest sense of the term) that the capitalist and the socialist country may export, so each of the 49 cells of the Table gives one type of exchange. The typical case already mentioned, capital goods for raw materials, is marked with an A in the Table.

In general we would assume that capitalist countries, unless they are very big and very rich in natural resources, would be loathe to export raw materials, and the same would apply to land and unskilled labor - unless these are dependent capitalist countries, in the periphery of the system.⁽⁷⁾ If they are, however, they would probably export those products to their own center countries - since that is what these countries will demand from them in exchange for consumer goods and capital goods. Correspondingly, we would imagine that the socialist countries would be loathe to export unskilled labor (against capital, the famous postal bank remittance) - that would be a complete capitulation. If Yugoslavia and Algeria nevertheless engage in it, the argument would run, it is because they are not really socialist. Socialist countries might like to export excess skilled labor,⁽⁸⁾ capital, capital goods and manufactured goods, however, and when they do not do so in the East-West setting in the West (or at least not much so) then it is not because they do not want to, but because their products are not much in demand and/or the capitalist countries deliberately place them in the international division of labor as peripheral countries, treating them much like they treat their colonial/neo-colonial peripheries.

Thus, in general it is obvious that most of the exchange possibilities are located in the lower, left corner of Table 2. And this is also where that ingenious face-saving formula, the joint venture is located: instead of exchanging across borders, sending the factors to the West and letting the processing take place there, what is done is to move the factories to the factors, established as "joint venture" inside the socialist countries. In practice this means that the capitalist countries export skilled labor (technicians), capital, capital goods and ultimately

also products (e.g. cars, only that they do not cross borders) and that the socialist countries contribute raw materials and unskilled labor - and, not showing in the Table: markets.

(B in Table 2). It is hard to see that this "joint venture" differs from conventional vertical trade: the research spin-offs are still with the capitalist countries, they will still retain the control of the dynamism of product development, and probably to a large extent be able to paralyze the enterprise, or at least lower its output qualitatively to a considerable extent, through withdrawal of essential capital and technology and technicians. Hence we shall not refer to this as co-operation (the "handshake in space" was some kind of co-operation), but as trade in disguise, and vertical trade at that.

It is our basic contention that this kind of arrangement is contrary to the interests of socialist countries - that basically speaking "joint ventures" imply that they have been cheated again by the by and large more clever elites in the capitalist countries. The ties established may have a certain binding function, but also a conflict-creating function, as postulated by Marx and Lenin. In all probability they will serve to make the socialist economy a dependent one, which does not mean a poor one or technologically unsophisticated one, but an economy incapable of setting its own goals and of experimenting with new means and modes of production the moment the turret is really open for the type of consumers' goods produced in advanced capitalist countries, coveted and enjoyed by the new emerging elites in the socialist country - and not only by them.

But this should not be seen as resulting from capitalist strength only; it also comes out of an important socialist weakness so far only effectively counteracted (at least for the time being) by the People's Republic of China. The weakness consists in the frequent inability to have a good answer to the question: "after the satisfaction of basic needs, what?". For that reason there may be some kind of phase movement at work here: a first, "puritan" phase where co-operation may maximally be of the A type, followed by a second phase where

basic needs have been satisfied and, some kind of "new class" has emerged, even vast masses of them - "middle classes" - and one proceeds to co-operation of type B. Of course, preceding all that is a phase zero of rupture, perhaps of economic boycott brought upon the emerging socialist state by capitalist countries sufficiently unenlightened not to understand that for socialism to be built this kind of rupture is welcome, even essential (and so materialistic in their smugness that they underestimate the power of ideas and faith). (9)

What would be the socialist counter-strategy to avoid this kind of penetration? Evidently one or more out of three: to close the country completely, to see to it that no new class emerges capable of articulating such more individualistic and frivolous demands (for instance for cars, the standard article in this phase), and by trying to lead the society away from the path of consumerism, towards some other path - e.g. to build a new type of society with "politics, not economics and technology in command". China was practising all three at the same time. (10) It is interesting to see how both the US and the Soviet Union are filled with people who expect this to break down, because they both believe in some kind of unilinear theory of history; history being the process they themselves have been through and are at the forefront of. Thus, the US would say that this is what one may find at below \$ 100 in GNP per capita; wait till the average comes up to \$ 500 - -. In the Soviet Union they would say that this is the typical Stalinist phase of sacrificing consumption for building an economic infrastructure; wait till the Brezhnev phase comes - -. They may both be right, but then they may also be wrong: history is not unilinear, the tracks are no longer necessarily laid by societies in the West - China may be paving the road for some new type of society that is less materialistic. (11)

Is there no other way in which trade ties may expand? Yes, if we get away from the assumption underlying the preceding analysis: that the capitalist partner is technologically advanced and has a strong economy, and that the socialist partner is the opposite of this. First, there are weak capitalist countries, in fact, most of them are - that is what the Third World consists of. Second, there could be socialist countries that have very

advanced technology and with strong economies - either because they have been socialist for a long period of primitive (and not so primitive) accumulation - evidently the case with the Soviet Union - or because they were quite advanced capitalist countries and turned socialist. Of the latter there are so far no cases, except, perhaps, GDR), but they will come - e.g. among the small countries in North-Western Europe - because of the other types of dissatisfaction with capitalism (not that it fails to satisfy basic needs of those in the periphery of the Periphery of the system, but that it counteracts all kinds of non-material needs - creativity, togetherness, joy, freedom of more subtle kinds, self-realization etc.) (12)

And that leads us to a new set of possibilities:

Table 3. Exchange partners between capitalist and socialist economies.

		Socialist country	
		Technologically weak	Technologically strong
Capitalist country	Technologically weak	C	first phase: D second phase: E
	Technologically strong	first phase: A second phase: B	F

(the letters are defined in Table 2).

Thus, everything changes the moment the two systems are roughly speaking at the same level of technological sophistication, and can exchange raw materials with each other, or semi-manufactured, or manufactured goods (C and F in the Tables). This situation may now gradually obtain in several parts of the world. Thus, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist countries may be inferior to the most advanced capitalist economies but not to the capitalist countries in the Southern part of Europe or around the Mediterranean in general (this would actually have been even more obvious had Occitanie been independent of Paris and Mezzogiorno of Rome). Hence, in that area considerable growth in this type of exchange, at roughly speaking the same level of sophistication, can be expected. Since the ex-

change is much less problematic than the A,B,D and E possibilities we would expect them to be accompanied by considerably higher levels of political leverage, not in the sense of one party dominating the other, but in the sense of a harmonious relation that might benefit both parties and world peace. (13)

The same argument applies to socialist countries that used to belong to the Third World (we use that as a political/economic concept, not as a geographical concept): they might trade with their neighbors, again focussing on intra-sector rather than inter-sector trade - by and large. With the blockade against Cuba lifted - so absolutely essential in helping Cuba build a socialist economy that could not be eroded through the mass influx of consumers goods, sending the consumers as economic/political refugees to the goods rather than vice versa (14) - one might expect much more trade between Cuba and her neighbors than the present trickle. But, and the same would certainly apply to the Korean case: the condition would have to be that no country tries to make the other country economically dependent, or lets itself slide into dependency.

And the latter is problematic because capitalist thinking is so primitive at this point. There is trade today, even joint ventures, between a strong socialist and a weak capitalist country: we are thinking of the Soviet/Indian case, typically of the D and E varieties. The Soviet Union was doing the same with China and the result is well known: complete rupture because China had a socialist ideology and saw the danger signals of dependency. (15) But India and most other poor Third World countries in the capitalist Periphery are not equipped with the same warning mechanisms - if they were, they would not have remained in the capitalist Periphery but done something about it. The alternative is not necessarily socialism, but could also be complete isolation a la Burma, or efforts to get into the capitalist Center by exploiting others as the OPEC countries may try to be doing (and as India perhaps tries to do in her orbit). So the Soviet Union naturally turned to India after having "lost" China, causing obvious resentment in China. From India's point of view what happens

is concealed by the thin veil of non-alignment ideology, trading with the capitalist powers and with the socialist power, balancing one against the other - failing to see that they are exploited by both of them. As a capitalist country India still believes in the doctrine of comparative advantages, and being accustomed to being the periphery of one the transition to being also the periphery of the other may not be that difficult. Needless to say, we do not believe the situation to be stable, for the same reasons as in connection with trade of types A and D. It should be added, though, that if types A and D are really of short duration, if they prove to be beneficial and do not lead into accelerating dependency on spare parts and new technology it is probably very positive. Usually that depends on the ability of the leadership to make use of the capitalist goods to produce more capital goods.

Hence, our conclusion is trade of types A, C, D and F - and considerable scepticism when it comes to the other types; if the purpose is co-existence, not merely to obtain trade benefits, however, and where ever they can be obtained. Symmetric trade, not asymmetric, is what is needed if some kind of harmonious structure is to be built.

3. Political relations.

Let us now use this as the point of departure for some reflections on political relations between the two systems; interpreting politics relatively broadly. In international politics one would not expect much possibility for cooperation in general terms; after all the images of what the world ought to look like are rather different. But this is as long as one uses the terms "capitalist" and "socialist" without any qualification. The picture changes immediately if one looks at capitalism and socialism at present as hegemonial, even imperialist systems where countries have positions:

Table 4. Partners in capitalist and socialist systems of hegemony.

Social imperialism			
		Center country	Periphery country
Capitalist imperialism	Center country	US-SU (EC-SU) (J-SU)	
	Periphery country		many possibilities

The problems is to switch the thinking from the economic to the political sphere. We have pointed out above that there can be economic co-operation between the socialist center and the capitalist periphery for the reason that they may be technologically more or less at the same level, (capitalism came first, and is perhaps technologically more innovative) or at least build trade patterns around an assumption of that type. But politically the field is rather dangerous: the global context would not permit much political co-operation between the US and Romania or between the Soviet Union and Norway unless there are some fundamental changes either in that context or inside these countries (and even then, as the case of Portugal clearly shows, the pattern is fraught with danger).

But the other combinations are filled with potentials for political co-operation. At the top is the most conspicuous one : what the Chinese refer to as superpower hegemony, which might at times be seen as co-operation based on a common interest to preserve the hegemonial system.⁽¹⁶⁾ Since the hegemonial systems derive some of their legitimacy from exchanges of threat postures, increasing destructive capacity of the war machineries on either side, etc., one possible line of co-operation would be to maintain the threat, like for the price of oil, "neither too high, nor too low". In other words, the basic point is that there may be common interests even overshadowing the conflicts both of interest and of value around the general capitalism/socialism issue.

If this is true at the top of the systems it should be even more true at the bottom: there is objectively a common

interest in becoming more autonomous of the superpowers. When the objective interest is not reflected in concrete co-operation (except to some extent in the European context) it is because the hegemonial systems are still intact and the superpowers see to it that such moves are not made, and because the pattern of superpower hegemony has not yet crystallized sufficiently for this type of Center-Periphery contradiction to mature. We would imagine that to happen in the years to come, which means that there could be some potential for political co-operation across the system-border for political leaders able to seize the opportunity. At the same time this may also be among countries particularly well slated for some type of economic co-operation that would turn neither of them into a dependency of the other.

However, political interaction is not only shaped by the global context but as much or more by the internal situation, and this, in turn, is to some extent contingent upon the economic configuration inside the country. More particularly, most countries today tend to develop highly authoritarian rules, particularly the socialist countries and the countries in the vast capitalist Periphery (the big exception until June 1975 was India - and then it took only a day's political work, to abolish a relatively democratic regime). Democracy, in parliamentary or presidential forms, is almost only found in the capitalist Center, because the internal classes have shared the spoils from centuries of external imperialism, co-opting the working classes into complicity by giving them some measure of political power through voting, and economic security through various types of welfare state measures (the social democrats are particularly good at this). But in the world at large the authoritarian regime, usually by the military directly (about 50 countries right now) or indirectly (particularly in the socialist countries) is the rule.

The reasons why socialist and periphery capitalist countries become authoritarian differ, however. The socialist countries constitute efforts to withdraw from some of the world capitalist system; that system tries to reintegrate them with

all kinds of methods including force - and this evidently plays up to authoritarian forces inside.

But even without that external factor, an authoritarian regime is likely to come about in a certain phase because of the rules of the socialist economic game. Patterns of trade, market behavior, production for demand and profit - all the individualist competitiveness of capitalism - are not easily uprooted and will easily be regenerated, unless some other system that appeals more to human beings can take roots. More particularly, it becomes a question of subordinating individual economic behavior under the rules of the system, which in practice means clamping down on black markets, on smuggling and on the "open door" through which inhabitants with the means to do so escape, to enjoy the freedom of consumption denied them at home. This instability will in general originate from the better off, for the system is usually capable of satisfying the needs of the masses and provide them with an existence that for them compares very favorably with the (periphery) capitalism that preceded it. Many socialist countries have therefore come to the conclusion that it is much better to let them go - as Cuba did.⁽¹⁷⁾ But the pattern of authoritarian regime often remains, particularly if the country is a part of the social imperialist system built by the Soviet Union so that a small group (the bridgehead for the Soviet Union) has to keep itself in power by means of the bayonets, and the tanks.

In the capitalist countries in the periphery the instability that authoritarian regimes try to control emanate from a combination of unsettles elites (particularly students and young intellectuals) and exploited masses - and much of the control consists in trying to weaken them singly and see to it that they cannot appear combined, in an alliance which otherwise might topple the system.⁽¹⁸⁾ Why the "unrest" - for the reason that capitalism in the Periphery does not meet the bill. It can do well along conventional capitalist dimensions such as economic growth, export and productivity - and elites mesmerized by such measures seem always to be equally surprised when there nevertheless is "unrest", and resort to explanations in terms of

subversion and terrorism to solve their own cognitive problem in a politically acceptable way.

However, when periphery capitalism is judged in terms of non-elitist, socialist measures, such as ability to satisfy basic needs for all, ability to make the country self-reliant (important in times of crisis and in order to be able to withstand blackmail) and in terms of participation, including the very important category of full employment, it falls dismally short. If to this one also adds parameters of inequality (after all, if the masses stand still or decline and there nevertheless is economic growth somebody has to "grow": the elites, upper classes, urbanized sectors including labor aristocracies), the picture looks even worse. As a consequence of this the country will go through waves of extreme authoritarianism to break the back of the forces trying to change it in a more socialist direction, oscillating with periodic moves in a more social democrat direction - but usually failing to understand how incompatible that is with being a dependent economy. And to this, then, should be added that the regimes also usually have some bridgehead function for the capitalist Center, guaranteeing that they can pass their economic cycles through the country according to the old formula "investment and consumers goods in, raw materials and profits out" in return for various kinds of economic, political and military support.

The political difficulty that arises out of authoritarianism, left or right, is well known: it generates in either side the desire to come to the assistance of those with whom they identify, and not only for selfish reasons, in order to maintain influence. The capitalist countries were always better at identifying with elites - businessmen, intellectuals, people with a face, with individuality - than with the masses, and the elites are the ones who are in difficulty under socialism. The socialist countries will in principle identify with the masses. The point is not whether either party really feels this strongly enough to do something about it in terms of subversive activity or even invasion to come to the assistance of repressed individuals or oppressed masses, respectively. The point is that either side will think that the other side is contemplating precisely this,

because so much of the rhetoric is in that direction. That strengthens the authoritarian tendencies even further, and will tend to aggravate rather than solve the problems of the displaced elites in socialist countries, and of the exploited masses under periphery capitalism. (19)

However, from this it certainly does not follow that such regimes cannot co-operate provided they are stable enough under their authoritarianism so that neither thinks it easy to topple the other. On the contrary, they may even come to co-operate quite well because authoritarian regimes have certain basic similarities. Take as an example Spain and Yugoslavia in the 1960's, one "capitalist", the other "socialist", both of them based on regimes that came into being after a civil war linked to the Second World War, both of them run by a single party, the Movimiento in one, and the Party in the other. If they were closer to each other and had no border problem (like Trieste), they would certainly have exhibited a considerable range of co-operation policies. But one reason for this is located in the circumstance that they are both mixed systems, ruled to a large extent by technocratic elites in harmony with military and party interests - to some extent even run by computers, and one computer should be able to co-operate with the other.

The question is whether there is something inherent in authoritarian regimes that may lead to a technocratic type of regime, and the answer may be a qualified "yes". A democracy can count on so much initiative and creativity from its citizens that the country can derive some dynamism from the people, and not only from the elites - and the same applies to the other great participatory form of system in the world today: the Chinese. (20) An authoritarian regime does not have this possibility, by definition, and has to substitute something for it. One possibility is planning, relying on experts and their formulas rather than people; another possibility is some kind of entrepreneurism - letting loose a number of industrialists, constructors, land-owners etc. A third possibility would be to do both - and that is what both Spain and Yugoslavia seem to be doing, creating remarkably similar countries within different ideological framework. It should be added,

though, that if the countries were totalitarian this would not work - then they are shaped in all details according to some master plan emanating from a very almighty center.

Thus, meeting in the middle somewhere the interests may coincide sufficiently for political co-operation to emerge on top of economic co-operation over a wide range of sectors - but it should be added that the price is considerable to the purists: neither capitalism, nor socialism. This is actually the old convergence thesis and what we have tried to add here are two elements: (1) we do not think this development is inevitable as evidenced by countries in the capitalist Center and by China, and (2) when it takes place one possible mechanism is through the intermediary of authoritarian, particularly military regimes - and since the military are about the same all over the world (except PLA in China to some extent), and tend to run countries much like they run armies (a mixture of planning and entrepreneurship) the outcome has to be relatively similar.

What forms will this type of political co-operation between authoritarian regimes of either variety take? Above all exchange of heads of state, top level meetings, declarations and projects, but little real activity. The reason for the latter is that it takes active popular participation to arrive at deeper patterns of co-operation, so plans tend to remain paper plans. It only takes the refusal of one of the parties to let its population participate actively in co-operation for the stale, establishmentarian character of these projects to dominate. In all probability this is what will happen to most of the non-economic co-operation between East and West in Europe, mainly due to the role and authoritarianism of the Soviet Union - at the same time as West will continue to exploit East economically (according to formula B in the preceding section).⁽²¹⁾ The sceptics will find this considerably short of the ideal; the enthusiasts will point out that it is preferable to cold war, not to mention to hot war. They are, of course, both right.

But what would that more ideal form look like?

We have in mind a situation that does not obtain in the world today but might obtain in the future: two participatory countries, one capitalist with parliamentary democracy, the other socialist with a participatory system more like what may be emerging in China and in Cuba. The countries would have to be technologically about the same level, or at least agree not to use the discrepancy as a tool of dominance. Both of them would have to permit considerable mobility of their citizens in and out - which would only be possible if the economic levels are not too different, and the political grievances of groups in one country or the other are not too obviously legitimate.

Under these circumstances a broad range of co-operation should be possible; and the citizens of either country could even benefit, conceivably, from the tremendous enrichment of life that stems from diversity - e.g. by living some time in one, some time in the other (which, of course, is rather different from the bland eclecticism of the two regimes mentioned above). If in addition they could find each other in joint resistance against big power hegemony that could add some impetus to the co-operation, even make it a deed of dire political necessity. And all this is a fortiori true if the two countries are bordering on each other and are populated by people belonging to the same nation, separated by big power politics, divided, between families, within families, between individuals, within individuals - -.

5. Conclusion.

In short, Korea. So it remains only to add the obvious: these conditions do not obtain today. But one day they may, and it may be useful even in the darkest periods to maintain a vision of a more desirable future - for one thing we know with certainty: that no situation in the world lasts forever, including the unfortunate situation in which the Korean people finds itself. The aspect of that situation, incidentally, is Western ideologies. They are alien - hence they are alienated, in different ways, not only divided. Could that once have a

unifying power like a shared bitterness at being a pawn in an East-West conflict and a superpower conflict not of their choice.

In an earlier article, prompted by the famous 4 July 1972 communiqué, this was explored in some detail.²²⁾ Not so much has actually happened since that time; the situation has proved to be relatively stable. Korea is still divided by that line drawn during the night August 10-11, 1945 by then colonel Dean Rusk, who had about 30 minutes to do the job. Evidently the Americans were surprised the Russians accepted. The promise from Cairo December 1, 1943, that Korea should become independent "in due course", has certainly not been fulfilled: there are two Koreas, not one.

Nevertheless, there are perhaps some pointers in a more positive direction.

- (1) Much time has passed since the war of 1950-53. Those who experienced that shock are still in power, but may not be so much longer.
- (2) At the very top there is a change of leadership in the South - when there also is a change in the North that might loosen up the situation. Obviously Kim Da Jung is the man who could carry the process of association (a better term than "unification") a great step forward.
- (3) Both Koreas are doing relatively well within the framework set - see Table 1. This may lead to a productive self-confidence. But they are not yet willing to see each other as something positive.
- (4) The world system might prefer not to have Korea as one additional powder keg. On the other hand, with increasing tension in the world along traditional East-West lines, increased tension in Korea is also to be expected.

One factor that may be to the good or to the bad would be the general neglect of the Korea question in a world that has

so much else to bother about. When people in the Atlantic area talk about the East-West conflict, they tend to think it is all in that area. This is related to a certain general tendency to hold Koreans in low regard, and to neglect the issue.²³⁾ In short, we shall still have to wait for some time for the federal republic of Koryō - or something like Nordic relations among the parts of Korea.

NOTES

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1. For some of the general theory of this see the introductory chapter of Johan Galtung and Sverre Lodgaard (eds.), Cooperation in Europe, Oslo, 1970 and Johan Galtung, "European Security and Cooperation: A Sceptical Contribution", Peace Problems: Some Case Studies, Essays in Peace Research Vol. V, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1980, ch.2.
2. For an exploration of these ideologies, see Johan Galtung, "Two Ways of Being Western: Some Similarities Between Marxism and Liberalism", Papers No. 97, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo.
3. For more on this see Johan Galtung, "On the Eastern European Social Formation", Papers No. 67, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo.
4. Probably the best book on transnational corporations, Barnet and Muller, Global Reach, Simon & Schuster, N.Y. 1974.
5. The Economic Study Group under the Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project has been concerned, for some time, with the general idea of exploring different types of negations of capitalism.
6. For a survey of some of these, see Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Revolutions", Peace and Social Structure, Essays in Peace Research Vol. III, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1978, ch. 8.

7. Which, of course, is what imperialist capitalism is about - eg. as explored in Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", Peace and World Structure, Essays in Peace Research Vol. IV, Ejlers, Copenhagen 1980, ch.13 - of course processing of raw materials may also be on the spot, free zones, etc.
8. Rumania does that in bilateral technical assistance programs the Soviet Union seems to demand of its UN experts a payment formula whereby they retain only what corresponds to their salary at home.
9. Some of this is explored in Johan Galtung, "Cuba: Anti-Imperialism and Socialist Development", Peace Problems: Some Case Studies, Essays in Peace Research Vol.V, Ejlers, Copenhagen 1980, ch. 7.
10. See Learning from the Chinese People by Johan Galtung and Fumiko Nishimura, Oslo 1974 - published in Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Germany.
11. See Johan Galtung, "China After Mao", Papers No. 61, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo.
12. This is where the alternative styles of life movement enters the picture - see Johan Galtung, "Alternative Life Styles in Rich Countries", Papers No. 29, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo.
13. Whether this opportunity is really made use of is another matter.
14. The 1980 outflux of people, however, must also be seen in other perspectives. No doubt it was also used skilfully by the Cubans as an act of revenge.
15. They needed another concept of imperialism, though, as the Soviet economic imperialism probably was not that important. See Johan Galtung, "Social imperialism and Sub-imperialism", Papers No. 22, Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo.
16. See the analysis of Chinese foreign policy in the book referred to in footnote 10 above.
17. See the paper referred to in footnote 9 above.
18. See Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression", Peace and Social Structure, Essays in Peace Research Vol.III, Ejlers, Copenhagen 1978, ch. 4.

19. Of course, it is also in the interest of the hegemonial powers in both systems that all these countries are authoritarian since that makes it possible to rule either part of the world through the elites.
20. Whether it is as participatory in the early 1980s as in the early 1970s is another question.
21. See "European Security and Cooperation: A Sceptical Contribution", footnote 1 above. Poland's indebtedness to the West is a good example, because of - among other reasons - deteriorating terms of trade.
22. See Johan Galtung, "Divided Nations as a Process: One State, Two States and In-Between. The Case of Korea", Peace Problems: Some Case Studies, Essays in Peace Research Vol. V, Ejlers, Copenhagen 1980, ch. 5, pp. 147-168.
23. See the excellent analysis by Yoshikazu Sakamoto, Korea as a World Order Issue, Institute for World Order, New York, 1978.